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Abstract:
Coastal flood risk reduction (CFRR) presents a significant public funding challenge, due to its high 
upfront costs and long-term benefits, and this challenge will increase with future sea-level rise. The 
funding challenge necessarily involves multiple levels of government, due to the regional nature of 
CFRR public goods involved. Yet there has been little research comparing such multilevel 
arrangements across countries, and in particular exploring the performance of public funding 
arrangements for providing coastal flood risk reduction. We address this gap, applying fiscal 
federalism to develop a multilevel governance analysis of public decision-making and fiscal 
authorities for CFRR in the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Australia. For each country, we 
locate key decision-making and fiscal authorities in multilevel governance arrangements, and 
analyse their alignment with the benefits of CFRR measures (spillovers). We find diverse coastal 
flood risk governance arrangements ranging from highly centralised (NL), mixed arrangements, 
involving regional centralisation (Germany) or partial devolvement (UK), to full decentralisation 
(AUS). Further, we find that in accordance with fiscal federalism, multilevel coastal flood risk 
governance arrangements are generally reflective of the distribution of the benefits across different 
levels of government, with some exceptions (Germany and UK). Finally, exploring the outlook of 
current arrangements under sea-level rise, we find that major fiscal redistributions may be put under
pressure by rising costs likely under SLR and future coastal development. This is particularly the 
case for those systems which operate under hazard-based, as opposed to risk-based, coastal 
protection policies. Further, we find that both fully and moderately decentralised arrangements may 
require greater central support for alternative measures, such as retreat, in light of growing financial
burdens on local governments.
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1. Introduction
Coastal flooding is a significant risk around the world, and will increase with future sea-level rise 
and coastal development (IPCC, 2019). Coastal flood risk reduction (CFRR) entails the physical 
measures such as seawalls, dikes and tidal barrages necessary to reduce the impact of coastal floods.
CFRR requires substantial investment. Current estimates of investments needed globally to raise 
current coastal protection up to standards of the most flood risk intolerant countries are up to US$4 
trillion (Nicholls et al. 2019). Moreover, investment needs will increase with socio-economic 
development and sea-level rise (SLR), and could lead to up to $70 billion in annual protection costs 
globally by 2100 (Hinkel et al., 2014). 
Meeting these needs is largely a public funding challenge. Governments often have statutory 
requirements to provide coastal protection, and are otherwise either explicit or implicit insurers of 
last resort (Jongman et al., 2014). Governments thus have a requirement or incentive to invest in 
CFRR and reduce their contingent liabilities. This a challenge for governments because CFRR 
measures generally have high up-front investments costs that produce benefits for the public budget 
only over the medium to long-term when damages from expected flooding are avoided. 
Governments can avail of various fiscal instruments to fund such measures, including taxation 
(Peterson, 2018), public debt instruments, e.g. ‘green bonds’ (Keenan, 2018), as well as cost sharing
arrangements with the private sector (Bisaro et al., 2019; Pauw et al., 2015). 
The funding challenge necessarily involves multiple levels of government, as CFRR generally 
involves (hard or soft) infrastructure with long time horizons, involving spillovers typical of public 
goods (Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016). Such spillovers, i.e. non-excludable benefits (avoided damage) 
from coastal flood risk reduction measures, implicate multiple levels of government because they 
often span multiple scales and jurisdictions beyond the immediate physical location where a flood 
occurs (Woodruff et al. 2020). An emerging literature has begun to explore this challenge finding 
that distributional conflicts that arise across different levels of government, e.g. over who pays for a
given measure (Storbjörk and Hedrén, 2011) and between jurisdictions, e.g. over who receives 
funding for measures (Adger et al., 2016; Osberghaus et al., 2010), hinder public investments. Work
in the US has largely focussed on barriers at the local level, exploring the acceptability and 
effectiveness of differential coastal property taxes through agent-based modelling (Mullin et al., 
2018), the influence of risk awareness and political preferences on support for local government 
finance instruments (Merrill et al., 2018), and finding systematic barriers to funding adaptation 
arising from a lack of capacity and misaligned performance incentives for local officials (Moser et 
al., 2019). 
Yet, while public funding of CFRR is increasingly salient, gaps in the literature remain. Studies of 
flood risk governance have taken up issues of how power and scale influence governance 
arrangements and policy design (Bubeck et al., 2017; Penning-Rowsell and Johnson, 2015), 
however these generally do not include detailed analysis of financial dimensions. Further, the heavy
focus on barriers to public funding, particularly in the coastal adaptation literature, generally under-
emphasises questions of explaining governance performance (Biesbroek et al., 2015). Such 
questions are important and have been developed in the environmental governance literature more 
broadly, for instance, through analysing the 'fit' of multilevel governance arrangements to properties
of coastal systems (Young, 2002). 
This paper addresses these gaps, analysing multilevel governance arrangements for CFRR with a 
focus on public funding arrangements. In particular, we apply approaches from multilevel 
governance and fiscal federalism, which provide arguments relating multilevel governance 
arrangements to performance based on aligning authority with characteristics of public goods, e.g. 
spillovers (Oates, 2005, 1972). Fiscal federalism is a subfield of public finance, that addresses 
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financial relationships between levels of government within multilevel governance systems (Oates, 
1999). Such approaches can shed light on the suitability of existing governance arrangements for 
meeting the CFRR funding challenge, as CFRR is a public good with potential regional and national
spillovers. Indeed, such political science approaches, while highly relevant to adaptation, have yet 
to be fully exploited (Javeline, 2014). 
The paper thus addresses the following research questions: 
1. Where is public planning and fiscal authority regarding CFRR located in governance 
arrangements, and how is it distributed across governance levels?
2. Are the observed governance arrangements for CFRR politically and fiscally well-aligned?
To operationalise these research questions, we develop the concept of “well-aligned” following 
prescriptions of the fiscal federalism literature, which are explored in Section 2.2. To address these 
questions, we translate multilevel governance and fiscal federalism approaches to the CFRR 
context, and compare arrangements in 4 countries (Netherlands, Germany, UK and Australia). Our 
comparative research design allows us, first, to describe current coastal flood risk governance 
arrangements in countries relatively advanced on this issue (Danielson et al., 2019). This 
explorative research objective is important in its own right, due to the lack of attention to funding 
arrangements noted in the literature. Second, the research design enables us to address performance 
questions in a normative sense, rather than positive sense, which is important given the context 
dependent nature of CFRR goals (see Section 2).  Finally, we reflect on the outlook for these 
arrangements under future SLR, given that SLR will increase the costs of CFRR.
2. Analytical framework
2.1. Multilevel governance and coastal flood risk governance research
Multilevel governance (MLG) research emerged to analyse the shift from hierarchical modes of 
governance towards shared authority resulting from European Union reforms in the late 1980s 
(Tortola, 2017). Political science-oriented MLG scholarship thus has a strong descriptive element, 
aimed at documenting change and stability in governance arrangements and associated governance 
modes. For example, MLG modes have been characterised along the dimensions of political and 
administrative decentralisation (Kuhlmann and Wayenberg, 2016), decentralised and deconcentrated
regional authority (Hooghe et al., 2016), or hierarchical, market, and network governance 
(Tenbensel, 2005). In the climate domain, recent work has identified the emergence of polycentric 
governance modes (Jordan et al., 2015).  
MLG generally views authority as multidimensional, comprising a number of core public planning 
and fiscal dimensions (Verhoest et al., 2004). Numerous authors use somewhat differing 
terminologies to characterise authority, and associated MLG governance arrangements (Feeley and 
Kesari, 2017; Kuhlmann and Wayenberg, 2016; Peters, 2014). We follow Hooghe et al. (2016) who 
develop a set of dimensions to characterise regional authority. While Hooghe et al. (2016) focus on 
regional authorities, we focus on multiple levels of government, and therefore we have slightly 
adapted the categories.  In particular, we focus on the dimensions of 'shared rule', which describe 
how authority is shared across different levels of government, because these are pertinent to our 
research questions. 'Shared rule' dimensions include three decision-making authorities of 
'constitutional reform', 'law making', and 'executive' as well as a 'fiscal control' dimension. We 
translate these general public authorities for the more specific issue of coastal flood risk reduction 
in Table 1, based on our own analysis, and drawing on the coastal governance literature. For 
example, for the dimension “constitutional reform”, in a coastal setting, we interpret this to refer to 
authority over long-term strategic goal setting for CFRR. Strategic goal setting is constitutional in 
that it establishes enabling and constraining conditions in which law-making and project design for 
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CFRR take place. Here, we acknowledge that, in contrast to the situation for the wider governance 
setting, such authority in coastal settings is often not explicitly defined. For example, in Schleswig-
Holstein, Germany, the strategic goal to protect the existing coastline is implicitly set through the 
State Water Law (see Section 4.1 below). Typical strategic goals for coastal risk, i.e. protection, 
accommodation, retreat or avoidance, have been identified in the coastal governance literature 
(Klein et al. 2001).  
Further, we point out that our approach analyses only formal rules, as opposed to informal rules, 
which gives rise to some caveats. First, we assume that formal authorities at higher levels of 
governance are not contradicted by local rules or practice. Thus, for the dimension “Set CFRR 
rules”, we focus on the level at which binding rules on flood safety are set, e.g. on protection levels,
set-back zones, etc., and assume that such binding rules are not contradicted by rules, or practice, at 
lower levels of government. If no binding rules are set at national or state levels, we assume that 
CFRR rules are set at the local level. 
Second, our focus on only formal rules means that we do not analyse implementation capacity, for 
example, of state or local agencies either in undertaking CFRR projects or collecting general tax 
revenues (e.g. from property taxes or building permits). Implementation capacity is an important 
dimension of governance, as are the incentives provided to government at different levels by these 
general revenue instruments. However, as mentioned above, this paper is addresses a gap in the 
literature on public finance arrangements for CFRR, and thus we have delimited the scope in order 
to keep our comparative analysis tractable.  Our approach thus provides an entry point for 
characterising authority in multilevel governance arrangements for CFRR, and the alignment of 
formal dimensions of decision-making and fiscal authority. Future research on important 
complementary questions on the role of informal institutions and implementation capacity in 





Meaning Translation for coastal 










Set strategic goal Which levels of government 
(co-)determine the medium to long-term goal for coastal risk 
management. Authority for such goal setting may be implicit or 
explicitly defined, e.g. through establishment of a statutory body 
for goal setting.
Typical goals are: protect, accommodate, retreat, avoid. (Klein et 
al 2001)




Set coastal flood risk 
reduction rules
Which levels of government 
(co-)determine rules for coastal flood risk reduction. For example,
CFRR rules may be set by exclusively national (or regional) 
legislative bodies. Alternatively, they may be set by committees 
with members from several levels of government.
Typical types of rules are: flood safety norms, funding rules, 
planning regulations.






Design measure Which levels of government 
(co-)determine the design of individual CFRR measures. Project 
design may be carried out by national level implementing 
agencies, or by designated local authorities. It may also be carried 
out by entities with members from several levels of government.




Fiscal control Which levels of government 
(co-)determine the total budget for CFRR, and dedicated tax 
revenues, i.e tax base and rates. General revenue taxes, and 
dedicated CFRR levies, may be set by national, regional or local 
governments depending on tax legislation.
Table 1. Translating dimensions of public authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) for coastal flood risk 
reduction.  
2.2. Multilevel governance performance
MLG scholarship also goes beyond description, and addresses questions of governance performance
in regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of public good provisioning. Such approaches integrate 
public finance and administration literatures (Peters, 2014), and are rooted in the idea that shared 
governance arrangements distribute authority and responsibility across multiple levels, and thus 
influence the incentives for provisioning of public goods by actors at different levels (Peters and 
Pierre, 2005). 
Approaches that emphasise financial dimensions, the focus of this paper, are those of fiscal 
federalism, which underline that MLG arrangements should account for heterogeneous local 
preferences, and enable participation and local accountability in order to enable efficient and 
effective public good provisioning (Kuhlmann and Wayenberg, 2016).  At its core, the fiscal 
federalism literature provides three principles around which to organise multilevel governance 
performance (Peterson, 2018). First, Oates' (1972) 'decentralisation principle' states that because of 
heterogeneous local preferences and a central government's difficulty in ascertaining these, public 
good provisioning should be devolved to the lowest level possible. Second, the 'equivalency 
principle' states that the level of government responsible for a decision should overlap with the 
jurisdiction or constituency benefiting from it (Olson, 1969). Third, the 'benefits model' principle of 
public finance provides an overlapping fiscal perspective, stating that beneficiaries of public good 
should pay for it, whenever possible (Kitchen and Slack, 2006).  Taken together, these principles 
imply that public good provisioning should be devolved to the local level, except where the regional
or national nature of public goods mediate against it. 
For CFRR, the public good provided can have regional or national characteristics due to the direct 
and indirect spillovers of CFRR measures. Direct spillovers occur when floodplains are large, 
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densely populated or interconnected. This is because, in such conditions, dike building at one 
location may reduce flooding in adjacent communities, affecting large numbers of people and assets
(Mostert, 2017). Indirect spillovers from CFRR occur when economic impacts of coastal flooding 
are manifested in regions and sectors that are not directly physical impacted by a flooding event. 
For example, a coastal disaster may disrupt supply-chains in a national economy, which thus create 
negative indirect spillovers (Lenzen et al., 2019). While detailed assessment of both types of 
spillovers, e.g. through hydrological and macro-economic modelling, is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we provide a rough indicator for each type of spillover below (Section 3).
Taking these two aspects together, that is, the principles of decentralisation, equivalency and 
'benefits model' provided by the fiscal federalism literature, and the concept of direct and indirect 
spillovers of CFRR measures, it is possible to derive some prescriptions for coastal flood risk 
reduction MLG performance. In other words, these prescriptions define “well-aligned” multilevel 
governance arrangements with respect to the spillovers of CFRR measures they govern. First, when 
both direct and indirect spillovers from CFRR are small, fully decentralised governance are “well-
aligned” and promote governance performance. Spillovers are small, when for example the coastal 
floodplain is sparsely populated with few assets, and these assets in the coastal floodplain assets 
make up a small proportion of national GDP, e.g. less than 5% (see Table 6 for measures of direct 
and indirect spillovers). In such cases, local communities are the only beneficiaries of a CFRR 
measure,  and they should be responsible for deciding upon and funding the measure, both for 
economic efficiency (Oates 2005) and democratic accountability reasons (Kuhlmann and 
Wayenberg, 2016). Second, in contrast, when spillovers are large, then centralised decision-making 
and funding of CFRR, involving actors beyond the immediate geographic scope of the measure, can
be “well-aligned” and promote performance. In this case, authority in MLG arrangement should as 
far as possible be aligned with the geographic scale at which spillovers occur.   
Based on these prescriptions for the 'alignment' of governance arrangements and coastal flood risk, 
we develop our comparative analysis of MLG arrangements and their performance. We note that 
our analysis of governance performance is normative in the sense that it assesses whether MLG 
arrangements are 'aligned' with prescriptions of fiscal federalism. In contrast, a positive approach to 
assessing MLG performance would take MLG arrangement outputs (e.g. policies, plans, or 
investment levels) or outcomes (e.g. risk reduction) as a dependent variable, and evaluate these 
against a benchmark, e.g. of “good” investment or safety levels (Young, 2011). However, for such 
positive approach establishing benchmarks to evaluating CFRR outcomes is highly context 
dependent, and depends on a number of further socio-economic variables, such as, values, risk 
adversity, and development goals (Dupuis and Biesbroek, 2013).   As such, comparing such 
indicators across socio-economic contexts, i.e. different countries, may not be meaningful. 
Therefore, we pursue the normative approach based on the prescriptions of fiscal federalism 
assessing the 'alignment' of the MLG to coastal flood risk spillovers presented in Section 5.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Case selection and data collection
Our research questions are addressed by examining governance and finance arrangements in 4 
developed countries with significant exposure to coastal flood risk: the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Australia. Each are advanced economies with long histories of coastal 
flood risk management interventions. They however differ in their CFRR governance arrangements,
thus provide a diverse sample of CFRR public funding arrangements, and geography of coastal 
flood risk. (See supplementary materials for more details on the each country and the relevant 
policies for CFRR).
6
Our cases encompass two unitary systems (United Kingdom (England) and Netherlands), and two 
federal systems (Germany and Australia). Though the differences between the two types of system 
are decreasing (Hooghe et al., 2016), federal systems generally involve an additional government 
level, i.e. the federal state, compared to unitary systems (Biesbroek et al., 2018).  Our analysis of 
federal systems thus focuses on one federal state within the relevant country. Data was collected 
through an extensive desk review of laws and policy documents and consultations with experts in 
each of the four countries (See Supplementary materials).
3.2. Direct and indirect spillovers in the cases
Table 2 summarises key exposure characteristics across the 4 countries (see Supplementary 
materials for more detailed description).  Measures of direct spillovers from coastal flooding are 
provided by exposed population, i.e. population in the 1-100 year floodplain, and the exposed 
population per km of coastline. We note that these are only rough indicators, and should be treated 
with caution, as both the coastal length indicator and estimates of population exposed to coastal 
flooding are subject to large uncertainties due to well-known weaknesses in the underlying data sets
(Neumann et al., 2015; Vafeidis et al., 2008). Direct spillovers are largest in the Netherlands, and 
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Assets 1-100 yr coastal floodplain (US$ billion)**









* Values from Hinkel et al. (2014).
** Derived from coastal population in the 1-100 coastal floodplain, national GDP/capita, and assets-GDP relationship 
from Hallegatte et al. (2013).
Table 2. Coastal population and exposure in the 4 countries.
A measure of indirect spillovers is provided by exposed population as a share of either state or 
national population, and exposed assets in relation to national GDP. This is also only an 
approximate measure, and we note that more comprehensive assessment of indirect spillovers, e.g. 
through macro-economic modelling, is beyond the scope of this paper.  Indirect spillovers are very 
high for the Netherlands (21.3% of national population exposed, and exposed assets being 60% of 
GDP) and significantly lower for all other countries, with Schleswig-Holstein exhibiting least 
indirect spillovers.  
In the next Section, we describe the key CFRR governance arrangements, before analysing their 
alignment with the spillovers described here in Section 5.
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4. Characterising multilevel coastal flood risk governance
4.1. Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany
The German constitution defines coastal protection as a “joint task” for all citizens (§ 91a), and 
public CFRR authorities are thus distributed between three levels of government, Federal (Bund), 
State (Land), and Local (Kommune) by Federal and State laws. This is characteristic of German 
federalism more broadly, which involves significant shared-rule between Federal and State levels 
across many policy areas, with state law often ratified by the national senate (Bundes Rat) (Austin 
et al. 2018).  A defining feature of Schleswig-Holstein (SH) coastal risk governance is a dual-
system in which authorities over State Dikes and Local Dikes1 are split between the State and the 
Local Authorities respectively (see Figure 1).
Authority to set strategic goals is held at the State level under the SH Water Act (LWG, 2008). The 
Act makes the State responsible for the construction and maintenance of dikes that protect the 
“general welfare” (LWG, 2008, §63 (1)), establishing an implicit legal basis for a “protection” 
strategy.  The Act also establishes the dual State and Local Dike system. Outside areas protected in 
the interest of “general welfare”  – nearly all of the North Sea coast, and short sections of the Baltic 
Sea coast –  local authorities are responsible.  
Authority to set CFRR rules is located at the State level for State Dikes. Federal law requires States 
to develop Coastal Protection Master Plans and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) 
Plans, and thus decisions on dike design heights and coastal land use are made by the State through 
the Master Planning process in consultation with multiple stakeholders. In line with the EU Flood 
Directive, the 2012 Master Plan introduced a uniform flood safety standard for State Dikes, and 
included consideration of 0.5m to 1.4m SLR this century. Dike design heights were determined 
using statistical modelling of the 1-in-200-year event plus an allowance of 0.5 m for SLR, or the 
highest observed water levels. Further, outer State Dike crests are to be widened from 2.5m to 5.0m 
during reinforcement to accommodate SLR uncertainty, as future dike heightening is cheaper with 
wider dike crests in place.
Authority for designing actual measures differs for State and Local Dikes. For State Dikes, the State
exercises this authority through the Master Plan. For Local Dikes, authority is held by local 
authorities, who are not bound by the Master Plan standards. 
Regarding fiscal control, authority is shared between the Federal Government and 16 States, who 
together fund the Joint Task for the Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection 
(GAK), the principal federal coastal protection funding instrument. The overall GAK budget, and 
project approval, is agreed through majority voting of the 16 States and Federal Government (with 
the Federal Government vote counting for 16). The GAK reimburses 70% of investment costs for 
coastal protection measures, not otherwise covered by EU funds. The State pays the remaining 30%
of investment costs, and 100% of maintenance. For Regional Dikes, municipalities or WSAs may 
receive 90% of investment costs from the State, and need to cover the remaining 10% themselves.
Since 2001, total spending on CFRR in SH is €600 million, with roughly half coming from the 
State, 37% from the federal level, and 13% from the EU (MELUR, 2012). A Special Instrument 
(Sonderrahmenplan) within the GAK was established in 2009 to speed up implementation of 
coastal protection due to climate change risks, providing an additional €25 million annually for all 
coastal States until 2025 (€550 million total) (BMEL, 2013). Schleswig-Holstein received ca. €8 
1 These are called “Regional Dikes” in the Schleswig-Holstein legal and policy documents. However, for 
consistency, we use instead “Local Dikes” to indicate they are implemented at a local, as opposed to a regional 
level of government.
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million annually from 2015 and 2017 through this instrument (BMEL, 2018).
Figure 1. Coastal flood risk governance and public finance arrangements in Schleswig-Holstein, 
Germany. The governance arrangements are described in terms of “Authority” along the 4 
dimension of authority described above; and “communication” between different government 
levels. Revenues and expenditures describe the public finance flows between different government 
levels. Beneficiaries refer to beneficiaries of CFRR measures, i.e. coastal populations and asset 
owners.
4.2. The Netherlands
The National Water Law (2010) delineates public responsibilities for CFRR to the national 
government through the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water (MIW) and its implementing agency 
Rijkswaterstaat (RWS), and the local Water Authorities (see Figure 2).  Further, the 2012 Delta Law
(2012) established a parliament-appointed Delta Commissioner to coordinate national policy on 
flood risk management and fresh water supply. This is consistent with the broader character of the 
Dutch governance system which is characterised as corporatist, concentrating authority with 
national government though incorporating various (non)state actors interests through consensus-
seeking (Biesbroeck et al. 2018).
Authority to set strategic goals is held at the national level.  The Water Law establishes ownership 
of dikes with the national government, and requires these maintained to flood safety standards 
determined by national law. Implicitly the strategy is to protect, as the scope for alternative 
strategies, e.g. retreat, is limited by geography. While the recent ‘Room for the River’ programme 
has involved ‘retreating’ by widening rivers in some areas, these measures do not reduce overall 
development in the coastal floodplain.  
Authority to set CFRR rules is at the national level, as the parliamentary legislates flood safety.   In 
January 2017, a new law regarding flood protection standards was adopted,  setting out a maximum 
level of risk in terms of human lives and economic damages (Van der Most et al., 2014). The new 
standard leads to protection levels of 1:300 – 1:100,000 years for various defence sections as the 
risk-based standard implies that potential flood impact in a given area leads to a higher protection 
level in that area. This represents a shift from the previous “security-based” to a “risk-based” 
approach. However, the minimum risk-threshold is very high and thus, in general, flood protection 
levels have increased, necessitating elaborate reinforcement works. The Delta Commissioner 
defines priorities for investment to ensure primary defences comply with the new standards by 
2050.
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Authority for designing actual measures is also held at the national level. CFRR measures must 
meet Flood Safety Law and Delta Programme requirements, though experimentation with e.g. 
Nature-based Solutions, such as the Sand Engine or the Room for River program, is underway 
(Stive et al., 2013). Implementation of dike reinforcement is carried out by the High Water 
Protection Programme (HWBP), a joint implementing organization from RWS/MIW and the Water 
Authorities. The Delta Commission, however, retains overall responsibility for coordinating 
activities of RWS and the Water Authorities, regularly reviewing whether current implementation 
programs are sufficient, e.g to account for sea-level rise, land subsidence or economic development.
Regarding fiscal control, authority is at the national level, which determines the Dike Account 
budget, the principal CFRR funding instrument.  Dike reinforcement is funded 50% by the Delta 
Programme, and 50% by regional Water Authorities, whose individual contributions are determined 
by national regulations and based on number of inhabitants and property values. Historically, WAs 
had greater control over taxation in their jurisdictions. However, following the 1953 floods, 
financing responsibilities for coastal protection were largely shifted to the national level, and 
reforms in the subsequent decades further equalised taxation levels between different WAs (Mostert,
2017). 
The Dike Account funds the long horizon HWBP implementation programme, funding large 
investments to 90%. The remaining 10% is funded by the Water Authority in whose jurisdiction the 
project is implemented. The current dike reinforcement phase runs until 2030, with a committed 
national budget of €367 million a year (total budget €3.8 billion). 
Figure 2. Coastal flood risk governance and public finance arrangements in the Netherlands
4.3. England, United Kingdom
CFRR governance in England has developed from a fragmented system with little national co-
ordination before the 1990s, to a more integrated but complex system, addressing a range of coastal
hazards. The UK Coast Protection Act 1949 sets out the legal responsibilities for CFRR, while the
2010 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 develops a more integrated approach to all sources of
flooding, following serious riverine flooding in 2007 (see Figure 3). In terms of law making and
fiscal authority, CFRR governance is generally consistent with the broader centralised character of
the UK unitary governance system.
Authority to set strategic goals is explicitly shared between national and local levels, focusing on 
risk minimisation rather than assuming the coast will be defended, through Shoreline Management 
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Plans (SMP) (DEFRA, 2006). Coastal Defence Groups comprise multiple local coast protection 
authorities working with the Environment Agency to develop SMPs with input from other 
stakeholder, such as conservation agencies, port authorities, or water companies.  SMP are strategic 
planning documents for sections of coast, ‘coastal process units’, defined based on sediment 
circulation patterns. The 22 SMPs (including Wales) each establish one of four strategic goals: ‘no 
active intervention’ ‘hold the line’ ‘management realignment’ or ‘advance the line’, but do not 
stipulate individual flood defence schemes, which are usually the subject of more detailed 
assessments. 
Authority to set CFRR rules is at the national level, as the Department of Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) sets national guidance on coastal risk management and, importantly,  
financing rules for CFRR. In 2011, DEFRA introduced the key funding instrument, 'Flood and 
Coastal Erosion Resilience Partnership Funding” or Partnership Funding (DEFRA, 2011). 
Authority for designing actual measures is held at the local level, as Coastal Protection Authorities
generally  have  operational  responsibility  to  undertake  engineering  and  maintenance  of  CFRR
schemes. While the Environment Agency also has operational responsibilities in some locations,
this is due to the historical idiosyncrasies of who owns the shorefront or flood defence asset in a
specific location. These local responsibilities are consistent with the ‘devolved’ authority approach
of Partnership Funding, which stipulates only the rules under which measures will receive funding,
and does not further constrain local authorities' design of measures.
Fiscal control is held at the national level, as the CFRR budget is largely funded through several 
national instruments. The most significant of these is Partnership Funding, which is dispersed based
on a weighted measure of a scheme's overall benefits; household flood risk reduction, with a 
weighting towards deprived households; reduction of coastal erosion risk; and environmental 
outcomes, e.g. for Habitats or Water Framework Directive commitments. Schemes that achieve 
sufficient scores are fully funded, though the bar is high, as recent fully supported schemes had a 
benefit-cost ratio greater than 8 (CCC, 2018). Lower scoring schemes require additional funding, 
e.g. from Environment Agency levies, Local Authority funds, or private sources. 
The annual national government budget for all flood risk management was £692m for 2017-18 
(DEFRA, 2018). The major source of CFRR funding is the DEFRA budget, which disburses funds 
to the Environment Agency and Local Authorities.  Other funding sources include: i) a levy on local
authorities, which accounted for roughly 3-5% annual total funding 2006-2015;  ii) levies from 
Internal Drainage Boards, (iii) local authority core funds (iv) private finance and other sources such 
as lottery, charities or community groups. Partnership Funding aims to increasing sharing of costs 
between the national and local levels, with a target of 15% local funding in the 2015-2021 
programme, up from 6-7% in 2006-2015 (DEFRA, 2018). We note that new funding rules for 
CFRR have been announced by the central government in April 2020, and will come into effect in 
2021 with the aim of increasing absolute amount of central government funding for CFRR.
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Figure 3. Coastal flood risk governance and public finance arrangements in England, UK.
4.4. Queensland, Australia
Distribution of powers between Australia’s Federal and State Governments is based on authorities 
specifically granted to the Federal Government by the States through the Constitution. As 
governance of natural hazards was not addressed in Constitution, it remains a responsibility of State
governments (Britton and Wettenhall, 1990). In Queensland, the Local Government Act establishes 
a third level of government relevant to CFRR (see Figure 4). This is consistent with Australian 
federalism more broadly in which authority in several domains is devolved to regional 
governments, while the national government controls taxation revenue significantly higher than its 
expenditure commitments (PC, 2014). 
Authority to set strategic goals is local, due to the devolvement of disaster management and land 
use planning responsibilities in the Queensland Disaster Management Act (2003). The Act 
establishes a three-tier State, District and Local structure with planning responsibilities at each 
level, enacts coordination responsibilities at the state level, while devolving responsibility for 
implementation of CFRR measures to the local level.
Authority to set CFRR rules is state level. However, these are enacted as process-focussed planning 
rules, rather than regulating flood safety. The Queensland Coastal Protection and Management Act 
(1995) empowers the Queensland Government to identify and map land subject to coastal hazards, 
and to direct Local Governments to develop an adaptation strategy in high-risk areas. The 
Queensland Planning Act (2016) requires consideration of storm tide hazards in land use planning 
including projected SLR to 2100 (see Supplementary materials). 
Authority for designing actual measures is thus fully devolved to the local level subject to State 
planning process requirements. Yet while the Disaster Management Act emphasises the need for 
identification and implementation of CFRR measures, specific works projects for CFRR remain 
absent from the local level plans.
Regarding fiscal control, authority in most sectors is shared between the federal and state levels. Yet
for the coastal sector, most funding is focused on broader disaster resilience rather than physical 
CFRR measures. In 2017-2018, the Federal Government allocated AUD$14 million to Queensland 
through the Natural Disaster Resilience Program to fund priority disaster resilience initiatives on the
basis of matched investment from the State Government. Yet out of 72 projects funded, only one 
was dedicated to coastal protection measure. Thus, overall funding for CFRR is low in practice, 
CFRR budget setting and fund raising rests with local authorities. Indeed, Queensland Local 
Governments have traditionally financed CFRR measures through some combination of directly 
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levied property taxes, borrowings and state and federal government grants. Grants have been 
provided by other levels of government have been through both schemes targeted at natural hazard 
risk reduction and those with other focuses such as regional economic development. 
 
Figure 4. Coastal flood risk governance and public finance arrangements in Queensland, Australia.
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5.  Comparing multilevel coastal flood risk governance arrangements
5.1. Alignment of multilevel governance arrangements
NL England (UK) Schleswig-Holstein (GER) Queensland 
(AUS)
State-dikes Regional dikes
Set strategic goal National National-Regional-
Local
Regional Local Local 



















National National-Local National-Regional 
(GAK)
Regional-Local Local
Set tax base and 
rates
National National-Local Regional Local Local
* depending on embankment ownership.
Table 3. Locating of public decision-making and fiscal authorities for coastal flood risk reduction in
the four countries.  
Table 3 locates public authorities across three levels of government (national, regional, local), 
allowing us to characterise the centralisation/decentralisation in each country, and assess their 
alignment to spillovers of CFRR (Table 2). We find diverse MLG arrangements ranging from highly
centralised (Netherlands), mixed arrangements involving regional centralisation (Schleswig-
Holstein), or partial devolvement (England), to full decentralisation (Queensland). As introduced in 
Section 2, alignment of MLG arrangements describes the relationship between distribution of 
authority and the direct and indirect spillovers from CFRR. 
In the Netherlands, governance is highly centralised, with all 4 dimensions of authority at the 
national level. Highly centralised funding arrangements thus cover 90% of investment costs funded 
either through general tax revenues or earmarked Water Authority fees. This appears to be well-
aligned with very high direct (i.e. 9880 inhabitants per km of coastline) and indirect spillovers (i.e.  
coastal exposed assets to GDP ratio of 60%) (see Table 2). The social acceptance of such 
redistributions can be seen as evidence of recognition in the public sphere of these significant 
spillovers. 
In Schleswig-Holstein, centralised decision-making authority is shared between federal and state 
level, consistent with the regional character of German federalism (Biesbroek et al. 2018). 
However, the dual State and Local Dikes system also means that part of the coast is governed in a 
decentralised manner. In the State Dike system, SH State has significant planning autonomy, as it 
formally sets the flood safety standard through the Master Plan.  Fiscal control – CFRR budget 
setting – is shared between the Federal Government and all 16 States (Länder). 
In terms of alignment, the State Dike system is entirely funded beyond the local level, and with 
70% of investment costs covered at the national level. For SH, coastal exposed populations are very
small as a share of the national population (0.13%), yet moderate as a share of the State population 
(3.85%) (see Table 2). Coastal population density is moderate indicating that direct spillovers exist, 
and provide an argument for centralisation at the State level. However, the significant federal 
funding appears less well-aligned, particularly under rising costs under SLR. We discuss this below 
14
in Section 5.2.
In England, governance arrangements are moderately decentralised. Devolution of authority to 
design specific measures for CFRR is accompanied by explicit participation of different levels of 
government in Shoreline Management Plans (SMP) in which strategic goals are decided. Fiscal 
control is shared between national and local levels. However, national planning rules focusing on 
finance allocation, e.g. Partnership Funding, mean that in practice the national government retains 
significant decision-making authority. However, as noted, updated funding rules, which foresee an 
increase in funding provided for CFRR by the central government, will come into effect in April 
2021.
In terms of alignment, over 90% of CFRR funding is national.  Coastal exposed population as a 
share of the national population is intermediate between the low levels of Queensland and SH, and 
high levels of the Netherlands (Table 2). Coastal population density is slightly lower than that in 
SH. These indicators provide only moderate arguments for centralisation.  Indeed, MLG 
arrangements in England reflect a mixed approach. Partnership Funding aims to reduce federal 
funding to 85% of CFRR measures (DEFRA, 2011), and can be seen as an effort to address a 
potential mis-alignment in MLG arrangements, given the low spillovers of CFRR for long and 
largely rural sections of the English coastline. 
In Queensland, authority is decentralised. Local government has authority to design CFRR 
measures, constrained only by State and Federal process-focused planning rules requiring risk 
assessments incorporating SLR and climate change. Local governments are largely responsible for 
funding CFRR measures themselves. In terms of alignment, the relatively sparsely populated 
Queensland coast shows low direct and indirect spillovers, and thus such decentralisation appears to
be well-aligned. 
Finally, we note that the alignment question addressed here focuses on whether multilevel 
governance arrangements promote physical CFRR measures. A number of other dimensions of 
alignment of governance arrangements are relevant for governing coastal flood risk more broadly. 
For example, an analysis of the general revenue generation instruments, such as, property taxes, 
building permitting and value-added taxes, would shed light on incentives for coastal development 
that arise at different levels of government and thus whether multilevel governance arrangements 
can promote coastal development strategies that ‘avoid’ increasing coastal flood risk. While we 
cannot address such broader questions in the present paper, extending the analysis of alignment in 
multilevel governance arrangements to such other coastal adaptation strategies is an important 
direction for future research. 
5.2. Outlook under future sea-level rise
Given that SLR will increase the costs of maintaining current protection levels, here, we discuss the 
outlook for current arrangements under future SLR. We note that the discussion below is generally 
applicable even under current coastal risk. For example, there is already evidence that German 
Baltic Sea communities have difficulties funding CFRR measures for protecting themselves against 
current risks (Wolff 2016; Bisaro and Hinkel 2019). Below, however, we focus on how SLR may 
exacerbate these issues.
First, centralised arrangements that exhibit mis-alignment between beneficiaries and funders are 
likely to come under increasing pressure from SLR. For example, centralised funding arrangements 
in Germany entail a significant re-distribution of federal funds to Schleswig-Holstein for its State 
Dikes. Currently, annual CFRR investment costs in SH are low as a share of the state and national 
budgets. However, SH uses a hazard-based safety norm ensuring that coastal areas protected by 
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State Dikes are protected up to a 1-in-200 year flood event (see Supplementary materials). The 
current Master Plan budgets the next 5 years of public CFRR investment. It sets out investments 
needed to maintain this 1-in-200-year safety level, while accounting for SLR of an additional 50cm 
in this century, a middle estimate of possible future SLR. To account for SLR uncertainty, the 
Master Plan also foresees dike widening to enable future heightening at lower cost (BMEL, 2018).  
Rising protection costs under SLR, particularly under such a hazard-based safety norm may bring 
into question whether increasingly large federal funding support will be maintained. If SLR 
proceeds quickly and foreseen costs are revised upward, substantial federal funding of SH 
protection costs may need to be re-examined, given that the spillovers to the national economy are 
relatively small. Indeed, there have been previous efforts to improve alignment through, for 
example, aborted efforts to implement a coastal protection 'user fee' at the state level in SH (Wolff, 
2016). As SLR increases protection costs, greater alignment of funding instruments and 
beneficiaries at the regional level may become more politically feasible because regional 
stakeholders may see a greater need for funding CFRR.  Further, the need for SH to consider a risk-
based approach, using, for example, use cost-benefit analysis, as opposed to the current hazard-
based approach, to its Master Plan will become more salient.
Second, for decentralised arrangements, coastal communities may be overwhelmed by the 
increasing financial burden from SLR due to budget and capacity constraints (Moser et al., 2019), 
and resistance from local vested interests to raising new funds (Beatley, 2012).  We already observe 
lower CFRR levels in decentralised arrangements, i.e. Queensland, SH Local Dikes, compared to 
centralised arrangements. 
SLR will increase pressure on local governments' financial and technical capacities, and this 
problem can be addressed in different ways. On one hand, local CFRR may be enabled though 
comprehensive and transparent rules for central co-funding support, as, for example, in Partnership 
Funding in England. Rather than increasing overall central funding, these funding rules operate by 
increasing perceptions of fairness and providing clear financial incentives for measures designed at 
the local level. However, it is as yet too early to tell whether this approach can mobilise adequate 
local level funding in aggregate.  On the other hand, the CFRR burden on local communities can be 
reduced through further centralisation. In Schleswig-Holstein, further State take-over of Local 
Dikes has a legal basis and is under discussion for several Baltic Sea locations (Bisaro and Hinkel, 
2019). Barriers also emerge, however, as some communities have already declined State take-over 
because they do not wish to cede ownership of coastal land, and with it, decision-making authority 
over dike heights. 
Finally, across all decentralised arrangements, alternative CFRR measures – other than protection – 
are likely to be considered.  In England, coastal protection strategies aimed at holding the line 
would cost between £18-30 billon, nearly an order of magnitude larger than current total annual 
spending on all flood risks, while for 66km of shoreline holding-the-line gives a benefit-cost ratio of
less than one (CCC, 2018). In Queensland, where low CFRR spillovers indicate that significant 
centralisation is unlikely, local financial constraints indicate communities may be forced to consider
alternative strategies to protection for CFRR such as retreat and funding mechanisms involving 
private finance.
While all of this underlines the need for alternative strategies to protection, it also highlights the 
conundrum faced by national governments. From the perspective of fiscal federalism taken in this 
paper, there is a limited economic case for central governments to support CFRR in coastal 
communities of little importance to the national economy.  Yet alternative strategies to protection, 
such as retreat, generally require support from higher levels of government.  Existing examples of 
managed retreat strategies in practice, e.g. buy-out programs in the US (Greer and Brokopp Binder, 
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2017), and pilot buy-outs in the UK (Brennan, 2007), show they are unlikely to be chosen and 
implemented by local communities acting on their own. In absence of central support for such 
strategies, coastal communities may face large-scale human and social losses that go beyond the 
economic dimensions emphasised by fiscal federalism. Thus, central governments may have an 
important supporting role to play in enabling such alternative strategies, and have a mandate to do 
so, i.e. to avoid human suffering in coastal disasters, beyond the economic case examined here.
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